Cyclicality is a well known and accepted fact of life in market driven economies. Less well known or understood, however, is the phenomenon of amplification as one looks "upstream" in the industrial supply chain. This paper discusses and explains the amplification phenomenon and its implications through the lens of one "upstream" industry that is notorious for the intensity of the business cycles it faces: the machine tool industry. Capital goods industries, e.g. machine tools, suffer a "double whammy" of volatility amplification of demand in the supply chain: the bullwhip effect plus the investment accelerator effect. This paper develops a system dynamics simulation model to capture these effects individually and in composition. It then explores the lead-time, inventory, production, productivity, and staffing implications of these dynamic forces. Several results stand out. First, volatility hurts productivity and lowers average worker experience. Second, even though machine tool builders can do little to reduce the volatility in their order streams through choice of forecast rule, a smoother forecasting policy will lead companies to retain more of their skilled work force. This retention is often cited as one of the advantages that European and Japanese companies have enjoyed: lower turnover of skilled employees.
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Introduction
Cyclicality is a well known and accepted fact of life in market driven economies.
Less well known or understood, however, is the phenomenon of volatility amplification as one looks "upstream" in the industrial supply chain. This paper discusses and explains the amplification phenomenon and its implications through the lens of one "upstream" industry that is notorious for the intensity of the business cycles it faces: the machine tool industry.
Capital goods industries, e.g. machine tools, suffer a "double whammy" of volatility amplification of demand in the supply chain: the bullwhip effect plus the investment accelerator effect. 2 The bullwhip effect describes the amplification of demand variance that occurs along a supply chain from manufacturer to retailer as a result of coordination failures and non-stationary demands. The capital equipment accelerator effect occurs because a small percentage change in product demand (automobiles, washing machines, frisbees, etc.) can create a dramatic change in demand for the equipment necessary to produce those products. We build on the work of Lee et al. (1994), and Sterman (1989a) in combining these effects. We focus on one "upstream" industry which is notorious for the intensity of the business cycles it faces: the machine tool industry, whose experience is comparable to many other capital equipment manufacturing sectors, such as the semiconductor equipment business.
To visualize the analogy, think of the machine tool industry as the knot at the end of the whip of the economy. The industry displays many of the same cyclical characteristics of the economy in general, but like the end of the whip, the distance traveled is greater, the speed is higher, and the effects more pronounced.
Historically, the machine tool companies have attempted to smooth demand volatility by shifting sales to export markets when domestic markets were depressed. The efficacy of this strategy has lessened however, as the intensity of competition in world markets has increased. In the 1992 recession, when aggregate world machine tool demand declined by 19%, American, Japanese, German, Swiss, and Italian all sought to strengthen their export sales during domestic downturns while competing intensely in their own home markets.
Toshiba has developed an interesting strategy to deal with capital equipment demand volatility. This highly diversified manufacturing company maintains a central division which supplies manufacturing equipment to the various divisions: metal machining, semiconductor wafer processing, circuit board assembly, etc. When demand from one division slows, personnel are re-assigned to work on equipment for other divisions. 3 No doubt employees who normally work on semiconductor equipment are less effective when assigned to machine tool building, but there are some skills which should transfer relatively easily, such as controls programming. This practice also encourages expertise from one area to be applied to another.
One traditional strategy for American machine tool builders was to build up a large stock of backlogged orders to tide a company over during downturns. Backlogs meant that tool builders didn't get caught with excess manufacturing capacity of their own, when orders dried up. When the U.S. machine tool industry has little foreign competition, this worked fine, although customers did not particularly like it. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, foreign competitors challenged American machine tool companies in the U.S.
market not only with new technology and competitive prices, but also rapid delivery. By 1986 the American industry was reeling; populated with many small, weak companies, customers who did not value manufacturing (and equipment) as highly as their own foreign competitors, and foreign competition that now ate up a significant portion of the "up" cycles when they came.
The volatility problem is one reason that the machine tool industry can never be complacent. Business leaders, consultants, academics and government leaders all seem to worry constantly over the fate of the industry. 4 Many policy-makers seem to accept the premise that the machine tool industry is a strategic asset to any nation. They often focus on what can be done to understand the sources of its volatility and to test policies which might strengthen the industry and improve the technology supply system the industry forms with its customers. 5
To inform our analysis, we offer a sparse model of the machine tool industry which uses the method of system dynamics to explain the exceptional volatility seen in the industry and to test various strategies which customers and suppliers might pursue to 3 Personal Interview at Toshiba Manufacturing Engineering Research Center in Osaka, Japan by Charles Fine, July, 1994. 4 See Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1989) , Made in America , for a description of the machine tool industry and policy interventions in a number of countries. 5 Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1989: p. 232 ) assert the importance of machine tools to a nation: "The machine tool industry stands at the heart of the nation's manufacturing infrastructure, and it is far more important than its relatively small size might suggest. All industries depend on machine tools to cut and shape parts. The entire industrial economy suffers if a nation's machine tools are too slow, cannot hold tight tolerances, bread down often, or cost too much. If American manufacturers must turn to foreign sources for machine tools (or for other basic processing systems...), they can hardly hope to be leaders in their industries, because overseas competitors will often get the latest [production] advances sooner.
improve the functioning of the industry. In developing our understanding of these phenomena, we have benefited from the work of Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang (1994) who developed a theoretical model to show that the "bullwhip" effect will be absent only if all of the following conditions hold: (1) demand is stationary with its distribution known to all members, (2) all orders are delivered on time in requested quantity, (3) inventory levels are monitored every period and replenishing orders are issued immediately, and (4) the price at each node remains the same across all periods. Needless to say, these conditions rarely hold as a group. We have also benefited from the work of Kallenberg (1994) In the next section, we propose a model which explains the amplification of the business cycle the further upstream a business operates. The method of system dynamics is employed to deal with the non-linear nature of the machine tool industry dynamics, and the large delays and feedback loops inherent in this environment.
Section 3 examines and reports results from the hypotheses we have tested with the model. In general, the model supports the hypotheses under consideration.
Finally, section 4 considers some of the wider implications of this work, and potential areas for future investigation. In particular, we hope to broaden our field research activities in the U.S., Japan, and Germany, in order to more fully explore the development of regional institutions and individual business strategies that nurture cooperation among machine tool builders and their customers, and to test the effectiveness of those arrangements.
Methodology & Model Description
To examine the issues of volatility which arise in the capital-goods industry, we build a simulation model of a typical machine-tool order supply chain. We base the model on the system dynamics methodology to cope with the non-linearities, feedback loops, and delays critical to understanding capital goods supply chains (which we will shortly describe in detail). 6 This relatively sparse model will not seek to capture the broad and rich dynamics inherent in the machine-tool industry but rather to demonstrate the essential dynamics relevant to our hypotheses. 7 As such, some explanatory accuracy will be traded for ease of explication.
The firm structure for the model is a simplification of the "standard" system dynamics firm model adapted to create two interacting firms, a machine-tool customer and a machine-tool supplier. 
Model Overview
We present here a descriptive overview of the model. The model's equations are included in Appendix A. For convenience we will refer to the machine-tool customer from this point on as the product maker, and the machine-tool supplier as the machine maker. The productive capacity of typical machine-tool customers such as automotive companies is very tightly constrained by their capital 9 . Hence, we assume a Leontief production function (no capability to substitute capital for labor or vice versa) for the product maker. In the model, the product-maker's capacity is based strictly on the number of machines it has in house. The number of machines increases with arrivals of new machines from the machine-maker and decreases as older machines deteriorate with time. are typical of the bounded-rationality approach used in system dynamics. 10 However, some of the "irrationalities" revealed by system dynamics research such as supply-line discounting (i.e., failure to "remember" the full extent of the stocks in the pipeline (ordered but not received)) will be excluded. 11 This exclusion will prevent confounding of the effects of "irrational" policies with those inherent in the structure of the machine-tool customer-supplier relationship. Specifically, in Figure 2 .3 the product maker receives a product order rate that is used over time to develop a forecast of future product demand. The method used for this forecasting is third-order exponential smoothing, which combines the effects of the delays inherent in forecasting, capacity planning, and purchasing approval. Makridakis et al. (1982 Makridakis et al. ( , 1993 has shown that simple smoothing-type forecast rules are typically equal or superior to econometric, ARIMA, or judgmental methods in predicting volatile time-series. The product maker then calculates how many machines (i.e., how much manufacturing capacity) will be required to meet the forecast demand. It then adds the result of this calculation to the machine orders required to replace deteriorating capital. Finally, the product maker passes this order rate on to the machine maker. In Figure 2 .4, the machine-maker goes through a similar forecasting process to determine its desired capacity. We again assume a Leontief production function (no capability to substitute capital for labor or vice versa) for the machine maker. However, since machine-tool makers are very rarely, if ever, capital-constrained, we assume that its capacity is constrained solely by labor. 12 Thus the desired capacity is translated into a desired number of employees and, depending on the current number of employees, a desired hiring or termination rate. In Figure 2 .5, the capacity of the machine maker is ultimately constrained by its employees. However, not all employees are the same. When an employee enters the organization, he or she enters a period of apprenticeship during which he or she is both a) less productive than a trained employee and b) in need of instruction from trained employees who could otherwise be dedicated to production. During any given period of time, a certain number of new and experienced employees will leave the machine-maker to take a job with another firm or to retire. This process of attrition is analogous to machine deterioration in the product maker. However, the machine maker can accelerated the exit rate by forced termination if the rate of attrition is insufficient to produce the cutbacks required by the machine maker's capacity policy and objectives. 13 13 This structure has been successfully used to model capacity shortages in labor-intensive industries. See Oliva (1996) . The assumption of lower average productivity of new versus experienced workers is supported by interviews with Cincinnati Milacron by Geoffrey Parker, April 25, 1996. Meanwhile, in Figure 2 .6, the machine maker, a make-to-order firm, uses its current employees to manufacture the machines requested by the product maker. The machine maker is constrained both by its effective work force and by its ability to vary production through overtime and furloughs. Once machines are produced, they are shipped to the product maker where they begin to make products. is assumed to be a make-to-stock firm. 14 Product inventory increases as products are manufactured by the machines, and decreases as products are shipped. Product shipments match the product order rate unless there is an inventory shortfall. Finally, each product manufactured uses up a parts assembly from inventory. Figures 3.7-3.9 represent a simplified version of the structure Forrester and Mass (1976) and later Senge (1978) used to successfully represent the US manufacturing sector. Sterman (1985) uses a similar structure.
Figure 2.8 shows the production system of the product-maker. The product order rate in past periods is again smoothed to yield a forecast order rate. The product maker uses this forecast to determine desired inventory levels and desired manufacturing rates.
The desired manufacturing rate may not be achieved, however, if there are not enough machines or enough parts assemblies in inventory. .9 represents the parts management structure. The forecast product order rate determines a desired parts inventory level. The machine-maker then places a parts order based on the forecast product order rate with a correction to adjust parts assemblies inventory to the desired level. We assume that all parts orders arrive after a given shipping delay when they replenish the parts assembly inventory depleted by manufacturing.
As can be seen from the previous discussion, many items of possible interest are excluded for the sake of parsimony. Factors not modeled include order cancellations 15 , pricing policies, and foreign versus domestic market share variation. However, we will show that the model conforms in general to observed machine-tool industry behavior. Values for variables marked with "a" are arbitrary and have no effect on model results. Those marked with "b" are drawn from experience and interviews gained from our fieldwork. These "b" values have been chosen to err on the side of conservatism with respect to the dynamics described in the paper. That is, other reasonable values would tend to enhance the dynamics herein described. The "c" values were estimated by the VENSIM® simulation package, which uses Powell's (1969 Powell's ( , 1972 optimization algorithm, but appear reasonable given our field work. Those values unmarked are drawn from Lyneis (1980) and represent stylized values based on data from Pugh-Roberts Associates, a large system dynamics consulting firm, and the MIT System Dynamics Group. Table 3 .2 presents a statistical comparison of the simulated with the actual data series. The typical goodness-of-fit statistic for forecasting, R 2 , measures point-to-point divergence between the simulated and actual series. A more precise indicator of the nature of the fit is given by the Theil inequality statistics. These partition the forecast error into three components which measure the fraction of root-mean-square error due to (1) bias, 
Hypotheses and Results
Our field interviews at manufacturing and machine tool companies have generated the following hypotheses about the nature and effects of cyclical volatility upon the machine-tool industry. 17 These hypotheses would seem, for the most part, to apply to other capital-goods manufacturers. 18
H1: The extreme amplification of cyclical volatility facing the machine tool industry is primarily due to two factors: 1. The inventory stock replenishment structure common to supply chains, sometimes referred to as the "bullwhip effect." 2. The link between machine tool industry production capacity and the capital discard rate of that industry's customers or "investment accelerator."
Response of the machine supplier to a step-input
Recall from Section 1 our articulation of the components of amplification, the bullwhip effect and the investment accelerator. In Figure 3 .1 below, the model begins in equilibrium. This means that, if there is no change in the product order rate from its initial value, there will be no change in the other variables throughout the simulation. At time = 10 months, an 8% exogenous step increase in the product order rate is introduced. The product maker's forecast demand immediately begins to climb to the new equilibrium product order rate. As the product order rate increases, so too does the machine order rate due both to the bullwhip effect and the investment accelerator effect. The machine maker is, however, constrained by a lack of employees with which to produce the requested machines. The machine maker uses a forecast rule that is slow to add employees because it does not want to mistakenly hire employees because of a one-time excursion in the order rate. Hence, the machine maker does not hire enough new employees to begin to reduce its backlog until time = 2.5 years (Figure 3 .2). In fact, so many new employees are hired, that there is a very slight employee cutback around year eight (Figure 3.3) . This happens because the employees brought in to meet the backlog in years one through three have driven the new employee ratio up from its equilibrium value. As the ratio returns to its equilibrium value, the effective pool of labor increases, creating a surplus of machinemaker employees. This hiring and termination behavior generates the characteristics typically associated with the machine tool industry: Lagged and amplified response of the machine order rate to product order rate changes, and a somewhat more lagged, but less amplified response in the machine production rate. This systemic behavior constitutes our hypothesis of the causal factors behind the bullwhip effect in the machine-tool industry. 
Comparison with the Bullwhip Effect experienced by Component Suppliers
A comparison of component (bullwhip effect only) and machine-tool (bullwhip plus investment accelerator effects) supply chain responses to the 8% step increase in the product order rate is presented below in Figure 3 .4. The component bullwhip effect in this model is roughly about a quarter of the machine-tool effect at their respective maxima under the base model assumptions. This result tends to confirm Hypothesis 1. In fact, we have used somewhat conservative assumptions for the delays involved in the product maker production sector; so in reality the comparison between the two effects is probably even more dramatic than here presented. 
Rationale
Interviews have suggested that the capacity of a machine-tool firm is primarily determined by the size and experience of its labor force. 19 During an upturn, the machinetool vendor experiences a dramatic increase in orders. To meet this demand, it will eventually hire more employees. New employees are less efficient and require training time from experienced employees. So the supplier needs to hire more of the new employees than it would if they were already trained. 20 During the next downturn, the work force is downsized again. The cycle begins with the next upturn, when the supplier again has to hire more new employees than it would in a less volatile environment. On the average, a firm in a more cyclically volatile environment will end up having a larger work force than it would with less volatility.
H2 Result
The variations in capacity resulting from, respectively, a 40%, an 8%, and a 0% peak-to-peak amplitude sine-wave product order rate are shown below in Figure 3 .5.
(From here on, we will refer to the 40% peak-to-peak sine wave product order rate input as the 40% input. The 8% peak-to-peak sine wave input will be referred to as the 8% input and the 0% peak-to-peak sine wave as the equilibrium input. See Figure 3 .6 a graph displaying the three product order rate inputs.) While the average machine maker effective workforce capacity in all three cases is 1,000 employees, the average total machine-maker headcount increases with cyclical volatility as shown in Figure 3 .7. The average of total employees over each simulation run ranges from 1,000 employees under no cyclicality to 1,320 employees under a 40% input. Hence, while an increase in product order volatility does not lead to an increase in machine-maker capacity, it does create an increase in average machine maker employment. Put another way, the machine maker's employee productivity drops with increasing volatility. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported by the results from the simulation model.
Figure 3.5-Effective Workforce Capacity vs. Increasing Volatility (0%, 8%, 40%)
(Note: Since new employees are less productive, they are discounted relative to their experienced counterparts for measuring the effective workforce capacity. The effective workforce capacity under the 0% input is uniformly 1000 employees throughout the simulation.) g p y g y H3: An increase in the volatility of customer orders will lead to a decrease in the average experience level of machine-tool maker employees.
Rationale
An increase in the volatility of customer orders will lead to an increase in the volatility of its machine-tool orders by the customer. In aggregate, this increasing cyclical volatility will create more severe downturns for the machine-tool supplier. It will be forced to terminate a greater portion of its experienced employees on the average than in a less volatile environment. This will reduce the average work force experience.
H3 Result
The source of decreasing productivity under increasing volatility described above comes from an increase in the new employee fraction ( 
Rationale
Production lead-time in the machine tool industry is quite long, but a great majority of that time results from coordination issues and the applications engineering necessary to produce specific products with machines. 21 Actually manufacturing the machine tools requires considerably less time. Basic operations management might enable substantial reduction of lead times, resulting in reduced work-in-progress inventories for the machinetool supplier. At the same time, shorter lead times would allow the machine-tool customer to better match capacity to demand.
H4 Result
As one might expect, cutting the model's machine manufacturing lead-time (MML) in half when facing an 8% input halves the machine order backlog (Figure 3 .10).
(Presumably, this action would also reduce cancellations if they were represented in the model.) In a real machine-tool supplier, reducing backlog size can lead to numerous improvements in operational measures including quality, customer responsiveness, and ultimately profit (Goldratt, 1986; Schmenner, 1988) . The benefits to a real-world machinetool customer in terms of a smaller gap between desired and actual capital are obvious.
However, there exist two potential drawbacks to lead-time reduction. First, the manufacturing lead-time affects the volatility of the incoming order stream relatively little in comparison with its effect on the average machine backlog. Thus, as the average machine backlog decreases as a result of the reduced lead-time, the proportionate volatility of the backlog increases. This creates an increase in the peak-to-peak volatility of machine production of 55% over the base case (Figure 3.11) . Such an increase in volatility may tax the production flexibility of the machine-maker as well as increase labor costs due to the phenomenon of H3. Second, product-maker capacity will also become more volatile.
Under a halved manufacturing lead-time, its peak-to-peak capacity amplitude increases by 53%. As can be seen from Figure 3 .12, however, this is a less serious problem than that facing the machine-maker due to the relatively small size of this volatility in comparison with average capacity levels.
In summary, the benefits from a reduced manufacturing lead-time are numerous.
However, the ramifications of the reduced lead-time in terms of the volatility of machinemaker production and product-maker capacity may need to be addressed when undertaking a lead-time reduction initiative. 
Lead-time.
(The graph below presents the response of the machine-producer's production rate to an 8% percent input under base conditions and when the machine-maker's manufacturing lead-time is halved.) 
Lead-time
(The graph below presents the response of the product-maker's capacity-as measured by the number of machines it has in house-to an 8% percent input, both under base conditions and when the machinemaker's manufacturing lead-time is halved.) g p p y p 
Rationale
While improvements in machine-tool supplier management practices are essential to reducing the costs associated with high volatility order streams, another high leverage strategy may be to have their customers-such as General Motors, Boeing, and other large manufacturing companies-use smoother machine-tool ordering policies. Typical practice in manufacturing companies is to cut capital orders at the first hint of a downturn and then to re-order the canceled equipment during a subsequent upturn. 22 While this policy may be good for any single customer considering its own interest myopically, in aggregate such practices only aggravate the volatility felt by the supplier, which in turn decimates the intellectual capital in the supply base relied on by the large manufacturing companies. 23 For a firm such as General Motors which has significant market power as a U.S. machine-tool buyer, such a policy may not make even myopic sense. For instance, one manufacturing manager at General Motors has suggested giving machine-tool vendors a subsidy during down-turns to keep their suppliers afloat. 24 While he was referring to a combination of pressures from both cyclical volatility and technology shifts, it is instructive that a large company might consider aiding some capital equipment suppliers in this manner. In this case, consciously avoiding sudden shifts in machine-tool orders may provide one form of inexpensive assistance, as the resulting reduction in volatility would also tend to reduce machine-tool supplier average costs. Manufacturing firms could conceivably lower their capital equipment expenditures through more level ordering since equipment may be "onsale" during industry downturns. At the same time, however, machine-tool makers may be able to improve their lot on their own somewhat by smoothing their own forecasting policies.
22 Interviews with manufacturing planners from two US automotive firms by Edward Anderson, May, 1996. 23 This volatility leads to lower supplier productivity, and hence higher costs for machine-tool makers, which may translate into higher prices to machine-tool customers. 
H5 Result
Fundamentally, the fulcrum of the machine-tool effect is the machine order rate determined by the product maker. In this model, as in reality, the machine maker's policies have very little effect on the machine order rate. Compare the effects of an increase in the product-maker capacity planning lead-time (TPPC) from 19.2 to 38.4 months with that of a similar doubling of capacity planning lead-time at the machine-maker level (TPMC goes from 18 to 36 months). Under the 40% input order series, machine order and shipment rates are unaffected by a change in TPMC, but a change in TPPC decreases machine-order peak-to-peak volatility by 45% (Figure 3.13) . Both policy changes also reduce machineproduction volatility (Figure 3.14) , while reducing the machine maker's new employee fraction (Figure 3.15) . Thus, while both product-and machine-maker can reduce production and unemployment volatility, only the product-maker can affect the stream of machine orders. In the manufacturing systems business, standard machine tools are often customized with the addition of applications engineering and systems integration. Many
German and Japanese manufacturing firms consider applications engineering and system integration to be core capabilities which must be done in-house. This view has changed somewhat in recent years with the dramatic economic downturn in those countries, but it remains a general observation. 25 Completely addressing the benefits and costs of this practice lies outside the scope of this paper, but one result of higher customer capability is that machine tool builders are able to stock more standardized machines, which the customers can then customize to their own requirements. 26 This implies that production smoothing is more feasible for those companies who have customers with highly capable internal engineering staffs. 27
25 Personal interview by Charles Fine and Geoffrey Parker with Barry Littlewood, President of Bihler Company, USA, May 26, 1994. 26 In general, there is anecdotal evidence which suggests that performing applications engineering and system integration "in house" makes a company better able to pursue successful concurrent engineering projects and to undertake continuous improvement projects. The trade-off for these capabilities is the higher fixed costs of the personnel necessary to perform these functions (Fine and Whitney, 1996) . 27 See AMT (1995) for an article discussing the migration of U.S. customers toward more standard machines, with a concurrent demand for more applications engineering support from machinetool builders.
In an ideal environment for machine tool builders, customers would take the lead in supporting suppliers over the long term to flatten out the worst effects of cyclicality, and to encourage innovation and continuous process improvements. However, many industrial customers do not take this leadership role, perhaps underestimating the effect they can have on the stability of the technology suppliers upon which they rely. One implication of this work is that machine tool suppliers might benefit by taking the lead in calling for and creating new relationships with their customers, and take part in institutionalizing them as standard practices in the industry. The competitive conditions of the new flexible manufacturing environment no longer allow suppliers to get by with simply listening to their customers. Some specialized machine tools have become so complex that in some cases they can only be serviced and maintained at full operational capacity by people who were involved in their development and construction. 28 Users often have insufficient expertise or experience to anticipate their needs, or even articulate them. 29 Suppliers will have to work closely with their customers in order to jointly instruct and learn from one another, so that machine-tool users get the most out of their equipment. This means joint commitment of time and resources to long-term partnerships for equipment development and sourcing. The payoff for customers will be suppliers better able to devote resources to research, development, and innovation; first-rate equipment tailored to their specific needs -aggressively supported and maintained; and as a result of these benefits, greater productivity. The payoff to suppliers is advance knowledge of customer needs, stronger user pull on innovation, and greater stability as customers pursue policies designed to reduce supplier volatility.
Cincinnati Milacron is an example of one company which is already building new cooperative relationships through their partnership with Eaton. 30 These relationships can be tracked, their relative effects measured, and then compared to the performance of more traditional, arms-length relationships. For example, customer-supplier pairs can be evaluated on performance criteria such as level of R&D and innovation, financial stability of the supplier, delivery time, product support, and the productivity of tools in use. If one considers these relationships to be solutions to fundamental problems encountered by 28 This is especially true for complex products which require machines with sophisticated applications engineering attachments. 29 Bihler Company, USA, is a machine tool company which has integrated forward into production, taking advantage of their unique applications engineering skills. They pursue a long term, high pay employment strategy and appear to be capturing significant rents. Source: TSC Interviews, 1993 
Appendix A. Model Equation Descriptions
Product-Maker Capacity Sector
The units of product capacity are assumed to be homogenous 'machines' each producing K units per month of a homogenous product. This yields a total product capacity for the firm of PC. Machines are increased by the arrival rate of new machines (MAR). However, simultaneously there is a machine deterioration rate (MDR) determined by the machines' average lifetime (ML). While this assumption of a constant fractional rate of deterioration is a bit simplified from reality, the numerical results of our simulation are relatively insensitive to this assumption. This result is consistent with previous studies of the effect of delay mechanisms in complex simulation models (Forrester 1961) . 
In order to determine the number of new machines that the product maker should order, it must first observe the product demand rate, forecast the future product demand rate, translate that forecast into a capacity requirement, and then get that capacity requirement approved. Given the number of steps involved, we have modelled this as a third-order exponential smoothing. In this way product demand (PD) is smoothed into the desired product capacity (DPC) via the time required to plan capacity (TPPC). The desired capacity is then translated into a desired number of machines (DM) and, combined with the machine lifetime (ML) and the machine manufacturing lead-time (MML), the desired number of machines in the supply line of production at the machine maker (DMSL). These are added together to calculate the gap between actual and desired machines (MG). The machine order rate (MOR) is then determined by correcting the gap between desired and actual machines over TCM months, and adjusting the result to compensate for the machine deterioration rate. Machine orders are never allowed to be negative. In reality, the product maker will cancel some of its machine orders during a downturn. However, for the sake of simplicity in our model, the product maker cannot do this. 32 This structure, the generic stock adjustment structure, is described exhaustively in Sterman (1989a) .
Machine Maker Production Sector
MShR = MC * MCU (10)
The machine maker is assumed to be a make-to-order supplier (which seems true of most suppliers to American machine-tool customers according to MIT TSC research). The machine order backlog (MOB) is increased by machine orders from the product maker (MOR) and decreased by shipments to the product maker (MShR). The machine shipment rate is a function both of the machine maker's capacity (MC) and its utilization (MCU).
The indicated production rate (IMPR) is the number of machines that could be produced given an unlimited labor pool. If no labor overtime is required, this will become the production rate of machines, which is the Machine Shipment Rate. If, however, overtime is required, production will saturate at some point, assumed in this model to be at less than 50% over base capacity. This saturation effect is represented by the function f1.
Machine Maker Capacity Sector
Machine maker capacity is determined primarily by the number of its employees according to our fieldwork. As such we will simply model the machine maker capacity (MC) as a function of its labor productivity (L) and its effective number of employees (EE). Our fieldwork has shown that new employees have less skills on the average than experienced employees. Hence effective employees is a measure which accounts for the lower relative productivity (RNP) of new employees (NE) versus experienced employees (XE).
Employees (E) are separated into two groups linked into an experience chain. New employees are those employees which have not yet received enough training to be fully productive at their jobs relative to their experienced counterparts. New employees are increased through hiring (EHR) and decreased through attrition (NAR), cutbacks (NCR), or by being trained sufficiently to become experienced employees (TR). Experienced employees are increased through training of new employees and decreased through attrition (XAR) and cutbacks (XCR). This structure is adapted from work by Jarmain (1963) and Oliva(1996) .
It is assumed that both groups of employees have constant fractional attrition rates which are modelled by the average employee tenure.
Similarly to the product maker, the machine maker smoothes the machine order rate (MOR) into the desired machine-making capacity (DMC) via the time required to plan capacity (TPMC). The desired capacity is then translated into a desired number of employees (DE).
The desired employees are compared with the actual employees to obtain the desired change in employee level (DCEL). 
The machine maker is assumed to follow two policies when laying off employees. One is that they will not cut back if attrition would accomplish the desired employee reduction in the time required to terminate employees. The second is that the employer will terminate its least experienced employees first. Both these assumptions are congruent with TSCRP fieldwork. The machine maker will cut back new employees at a rate (NCR) determined by the number of desired new employee cutbacks (NC) and the time required to terminate employees (TTE). If feasible, all the employee cutbacks are taken from new employees.
Otherwise, as many new employees are slated for cutback as possible. The rightmost term in equation 27 reflects the fact that the machine maker accounts for attrition in determining employee cutbacks (EC). The experienced cutback rate (XCR) makes up the remainder of the cutbacks.
Product Production Sector
This sector does not affect the dynamics of the machine-tool ordering model. However, it is presented to give a comparison of the bullwhip effect along the components versus the machine-tool supply chain. The following is a simplified version of the System Dynamics National Model (Forrester and Mass, 1976; Senge 1978; Sterman, 1985 .) The simplifications are justified as we are only interested in the gross volatility of the supply chain rather than point-prediction effects.
The product maker is assumed to be a make-to-stock firm that produces products constrained by its capacity and its parts availability. Each product is assumed to be composed of one generic parts assembly.
(d/dt) FPI = PPR -PSR
The finished product inventory (FPI) is decreased by product shipments (PSR) and replenished by product production (PPR). PSR = min (POR, FPI/TFI)
The product shipment rate will satisfy the product order rate (POR) unless inventory is quite low; in which case the shipment rate is constrained to be no greater than the a fixed fractional rate of shipping product inventory during a specified time to flush inventory (TFI). PPR = CPPR * g (AA), g(0) = 0, g(x≥1) = 1
g' ≥ 0, g" ≤ 0
The product production rate (PPR) is determined by adjusting the capacity constrained product production rate (CPPR) downwards if the process is starved for parts. This is modelled by the action of the function g upon parts assembly availability (AA). Parts Assembly Availability is determined by comparing the ratio of the capacity constrained production rate to the parts assembly inventory (AI) and normalizing by a reference assembly inventory coverage (RAIC). CPPR = PC * PCU (34) PCU = f2 (IPPR/PC) , f2(0) = 0, f2(1) = 1, f2(infinity) < infinity (35) f2' ≥ 0, f2''≤ 0
IPPR= FPOR + CFPIR (36)
The capacity constrained product production rate is determined by the product capacity (equation 3) and the product capacity utilization (PCU). If the indicated product production rate (IPPR) is too high, f2 will limit the capacity utilization of the product maker in a manner similar to f1 in equation 11. The indicated product production rate satisfies the forecast product order rate (FPOR) but also corrects the level of the finished product inventory level (CFPIR). 
In a fashion very similar to the finished product inventory management structure, the parts assembly order rate is determined by the forecast product order rate (FPOR) with a correction for assembly inventory level (CAIR). This is found by comparing the desired assembly inventory (DAI) with the actual and adjusting over a period of TCAI months.
The desired assembly inventory is determined by calculating a desired assembly inventory coverage (DAIC) in months of the forecast product order rate
